Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence
A Paperback edition by Sheena Chestnut Greitens in English (Aug 16, 2016)
+ FREE delivery
RRP $29.99 You save $4.60 (15%)
Print on demand
Short Description: How do dictators stay in power? When, and how, do they use repression to do so? Dictators and their Secret Police explores the role of the coercive apparatus under authoritarian... Read more
How do dictators stay in power? When, and how, do they use repression to do so? Dictators and their Secret Police explores the role of the coercive apparatus under authoritarian rule in Asia - how these secret organizations originated, how they operated, and how their violence affected ordinary citizens. Greitens argues that autocrats face a coercive dilemma: whether to create internal security forces designed to manage popular mobilization, or defend against potential coup. Violence against civilians, she suggests, is a byproduct of their attempt to resolve this dilemma. Drawing on a wealth of new historical evidence, this book challenges conventional wisdom on dictatorship: what autocrats are threatened by, how they respond, and how this affects the lives and security of the millions under their rule. It offers an unprecedented view into the use of surveillance, coercion, and violence, and sheds new light on the institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power.
- Sheena Chestnut Greitens
- Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics
- Cambridge University Press
- Publication date
- Aug 16, 2016
- Product dimensions
- 158 x 228 x 17mm
Part I. The Puzzle and the Argument: 1. Introduction; 2. A theory of coercive institutions and state violence; Part II. The Origins of Coercive Institutions: 3. Organizing coercion in Taiwan; 4. Organizing coercion in the Philippines; 5. Organizing coercion in South Korea; Part III. Coercive Institutions and State Violence: 6. Coercive institutions and repression in Taiwan; 7. Coercive institutions and repression in the Philippines; 8. Coercive institutions and repression in South Korea; Part IV. Extensions and Conclusions: 9. Extending the argument: coercion outside East Asia; 10. Conclusion; Appendix. A note on sources.